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A Few Contributions of Economic
Theory to Social Welfare Policy Analysis
MICHAEL A. LEWIS
State University of New York
School of Social Welfare
The National Association of Social Workers' (NAS W) code of ethics states
that social workers have a professional obligation to advocate for social
policies that promote the general welfare (NASW, 1996). Presumably, in
an effort to provide social workers with the analytical tools that would allow
them to do so, schools of social work typically require students to do course
work in the area of social welfare policy. Although these courses provide
students with valuable information, it is my view that they tend to be
limited in one important respect. They usually do not contain a great deal
of content on how technical economic theory can be utilized in the examina-
tion of many of the social welfare policy issues that are of interest to social
workers. This is unfortunate because, despite having limitations of its own,
economics provides a powerful set of conceptual tools that are extremely
useful in the analysis of social welfare policy issues. The rest of this paper
is an attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of economics in this respect.
Competing Ends, Allocation, and Opportunity Cost
Economics is usually defined as the study of the allocation
of scarce resources among competing ends. Four terms in this
definition need to be explained: resources, scarcity, competing ends,
and allocation. Let's first take a look at resources.
Machines, skills, knowledge, abilities, etc. that are used to
produce/provide goods/services are what economists mean by
resources. For example, the skills/knowledge of a social worker
who provides family counseling are resources.
Scarcity has to do with the relationship between resources and
the wants or desires of actors. Economists assume that resources
are limited (e.g., there is not an infinite supply of social work
skills/knowledge). The wants of actors, however, are assumed
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to be unlimited (e.g., our desires for services provided by social
workers are infinite). This situation of finite resources and infinite
wants is what economists mean by scarcity.
Although scarcity is a core concept in economics (Lewis, 1957)
it is my view that it is also one of the discipline's most problematic.
To the extent it appears that scarcity exists, it is unclear whether
this is due to a situation of finite resources and infinite wants. For
example, there are about 40 million individuals in the U.S. who
currently are without health insurance (Weiss and Lonnquist,
1997). Presumably, many of these individuals want health in-
surance but are unable to afford it. It is questionable whether
this state of affairs is a result of the U.S. not possessing enough
doctors, nurses, hospitals, etc. to meet these wants. Arguably,
this state of affairs is more a consequence of political decisions
than scarcity of resources. There are a number of public financial
mechanisms (e.g., income tax increases, corporate tax increases,
transfer of federal funds from the defense budget, etc.) that could
be used to finance health insurance for these individuals if we
had the political will to do so.
Competing ends and allocation are other economic terms that
need to be explained. As economists see it, actors possess de-
sires, ends, or wants. Some examples of actors are individual
persons, families, social service organizations, and the federal
government. Let's imagine that there is a single woman who has
a two-year old son. She wants to stay home from work so she
can raise her son, yet she also wants the goods/services she'd
be able to purchase with the money she'd make from work-
ing. If this woman decides to stay home, her desire for these
goods/services cannot be met. When desires "conflict" as do this
woman's, economists think of such desires as competing with
one another; hence the concept of competing ends. These types of
situations require actors to make difficult choices. Our imaginary
woman would have to decide whether she wants to indulge her
preference for staying home with her son or the one for going
to work to make some money. In the language of economics, this
woman would have to decide how she is going to allocate her time
between working and staying at home.
The hypothetical example about the woman is related to an-
other important economic concept. In order to be able to stay
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home with her son, the woman would have to forgo the goods/
services she'd be able to purchase with the income she'd receive
from working. This notion of the need to forgo some things in
order to attain others is captured by the concept of opportunity cost.
In economic terms, the opportunity cost of the woman's indulging
her desire to stay home with her son would be the goods/services
given up as a consequence of her choice not to work.
From a social welfare policy point of view, a program could
be enacted that would provide this woman with an income she
did not have to work outside the home to receive. Such a policy
could be based on the recognition that raising children is valuable
work. If such a program existed, this woman would be able to
raise her son and obtain some of the goods/services she desires.
My intention here is not to argue the merits of such a policy.
It is merely to illustrate how the concepts of opportunity cost,
allocation, and competing ends are relevant to the social welfare
policy concerns of social workers.
Market Failures
In economic theory, the term market refers to a set of sellers
and buyers who exchange goods and services. Markets serve as
the means by which many of the goods/services produced in
our economy are distributed. Those willing and able to purchase
specific products at specific prices at specific points in time are
allowed to receive those products. Those unwilling and/or un-
able to do so are not allowed to receive them. One of the primary
concerns of policy oriented economists is the following question:
under what conditions is government justified in "interfering"
with market distribution of goods/services (Stevens, 1993 and
Stiglitz, 1988)? This is obviously a question social workers are
interested in too, and economists' answers to it constitute some
of the most important contributions of economic theory to the
examination of social welfare policy issues.
According to economic theory, markets ought to be the sole
mechanisms of distribution unless at least one of the following
three conditions are met: 1) the good/service in question is a public
good 2) the good/service generates externalities in production or
consumption or 3) the market in which the good/service is dis-
tributed is characterized by imperfect information. Public goods,
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externalities, and imperfect information are examples of what
economists call market failures. When such failures exist, economic
theory tells us that governmental actors can justifiably inter-
vene into markets and effect the distribution of goods/services
(Stevens, 1993). Let's first take a look at why public goods are
thought to justify governmental intervention.
In order to make clear what economists mean by public goods
and why they think government can justifiably provide them, it
is necessary to first discuss the concept of private goods. Private
goods are goods/services that possess one crucial characteristic:
the characteristic of excludability. If one individual consumes a
private good, others can be excluded from simultaneously doing
so. The excludability characteristic that is associated with private
goods means that markets can be relied upon to distribute them.
This is because those who value private goods can be excluded
from enjoying the benefits of such goods if they are not willing to
pay for them (Johansson, 1994).
Let's consider an example. Suppose Jack is wearing a shirt.
While he is doing so, no one else can simultaneously wear this
shirt. In other words, others can be excluded from the benefits of
wearing the shirt while Jack is wearing it. The only ways others
could enjoy these benefits would be to buy shirts for themselves
or receive shirts as gifts. Thus, those in the business of selling
shirts (and other private goods/ services) stand a good chance of
profiting from doing so because they don't have to worry about
the problem of people being able to benefit from wearing shirts
without someone having to pay for them.
Public goods are goods/services that are not characterized
by excludability (Johansson, 1994). The classic example of a pub-
lic good is a lighthouse. If the crew of one ship consumes the
light provided by a lighthouse, other ships' crewmembers cannot
be excluded from simultaneously doing so. The crewmembers
of ships probably regard the light derived from lighthouses as
beneficial to them. Suppose a firm tried to provide lighthouse
service through the market, that is to say suppose it tried to
charge a fee for this service. Would this firm be likely to profit
from this provision? Economic theory predicts that the answer to
this question is no.
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Because the lighthouse is a public good, all ships' crewmem-
bers would be able to simultaneously utilize its service whether or
not they paid for it. If crewmembers could receive lighthouse ser-
vice without paying for it, there would be little incentive for them
to pay for this service. Consequently, most, if not all crewmembers
would choose not to pay the lighthouse firm. But if the lighthouse
firm were not paid or paid very little, it would be impossible or dif-
ficult for it to make a profit. And if the firm faced difficulty making
a profit, it would most likely leave the lighthouse business. Thus,
if we left lighthouse provision to the market, the result would
probably be that a service that would provide clear social benefit
would not be produced. This analysis of lighthouse provision
applies to all public goods. If we tried to distribute them by way of
the market, even though they would provide clear social benefit,
they would probably not be produced. This is because no firm
would have an incentive to produce them because no consumer
would have an incentive to pay for them.
According to economic theory, the way to increase the likeli-
hood that public goods will be produced is to create a mechanism
by which people are "forced" to pay for them. Taxation is such a
mechanism. By requiring people to pay taxes or face negative
sanctions, governmental authorities put themselves in a posi-
tion to assure that most people will "back up" their preferences
for public goods with the resources required for their produc-
tion/provision. Because people do benefit from public goods and
governmental actors are in a position to force people to pay for the
provision of them, governmental production/provision of public
goods can be justified (Stiglitz, 1988). Let's take a look at another
public good that might be more of interest to social workers.
Imagine there is a large firm that manufactures cars. Imagine
further that this firm chronically dumps chemical waste into a
city's water supply Medical experts have found that ingesting
this chemical is strongly correlated with the development of a
certain type of cancer. Suppose that a private sector firm is created
to clean up the city's water supply and that it is not technically
possible for the firm to prevent the city's residents from obtaining the
cleaner water from their faucets. This technical impossibility results
in the cleaner water being a public good because the inability to
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prevent them from drinking it means that city residents could not
be excluded from doing so. Would the firm be able to profit from
cleaning up the city's water supply? Economic theory predicts
that the answer to this question is no.
If the firm were able to successfully clean up the water supply,
this, other things being equal, would reduce the chances that city
residents would develop the type of cancer associated with the
chemical that was found in the water. But since the firm would
have no way to prevent those who did not pay for its service from
drinking the clean water, most, if not all, city residents would
be unwilling to pay the firm for the privilege of doing so. And
if the firm were not paid by most of those benefiting from its
service, it would not be able to profit from providing it. From
an economic point of view, since removal of the chemical from
residents' drinking water would result in the production of a
public good, the city government would be justified if it taxed its
residents to finance a public sector firm to conduct this removal.
Market generated externalities are other conditions that jus-
tify governmental interventions. In order to understand the con-
cept of externality, one needs to reflect a little about why people
voluntarily choose to consume, produce, and exchange specific
goods/services. They do so because they expect that the positive
consequences or benefits from doing so will outweigh the neg-
ative consequences or costs of doing so. For example, a person
voluntarily chooses to buy a car because he or she believes the
benefit from owning the car will outweigh the cost of owning it.
In many cases, only those who have voluntarily agreed to
participate in consumption and production enjoy the benefits or
incur the costs associated with these activities. When benefits are
enjoyed by or costs incurred by those who have not voluntarily
agreed to the enjoyment of these benefits or the payment of these
costs, externalities are said to exist. Externalities can be positive
or negative. A negative externality is one that is costly, while a
positive externality is one that is beneficial (Stevens, 1993). I have
already discussed an example of a negative externality although
this term was not used in the discussion.
The automobile manufacturer that dumps waste into the city's
water supply imposes a negative externality onto the city's resi-
dents. These residents have not voluntarily agreed to drink water
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with a dangerous chemical in it. The consequences of drinking this
water are costly in terms of premature deaths, increased health
expenses, etc. The firm doesn't appear to have a clear economic
incentive to develop a production process that doesn't endanger
the city's water supply. In fact, if the development of a "cleaner"
production process would significantly increase the firm's cost of
doing business, it would have an economic incentive not to adopt
this cleaner process.
According to economic theory, since markets don't necessarily
provide firms with incentives to curb negative externalities, gov-
ernments can justifiably enact policies that require firms to do so
or that require them to pay taxes that provide governments with
the resources necessary to do so (Stiglitz, 1988). To return to the
example about the chemical waste, the city government would
be justified if it passed a law that required the firm to develop a
cleaner production process. It would also be justified if it required
the firm to pay a special tax that helped to finance the work of a
public sector company that specialized in removing the chemical
from the city's water supply.
The example of chemical waste is an example of a negative
externality that results from the production of a good. Sometimes
consumption leads to negative externalities as well. Suppose En-
rico enjoys smoking and decides to "light up" in a crowded
office. Enrico's co-workers, however, hate being around smok-
ers because they have learned that "second hand" smoking is
carcinogenic. In this case, Enrico's choice to smoke results in a
negative externality imposed onto his co-workers. From the point
of view of economic theory, the government would be justified
if it enacted a law that proscribed smoking in offices and other
public establishments or required owners of such establishments
to construct separate smoking and non-smoking sections.
The examples about chemical waste and smoking should
make it clear that social workers concerned about the negative
effects of pollution on the welfare of clients could draw upon
economic theory to justify policies intended to prevent or curtail
these effects. Given the role economics often plays in social wel-
fare policy debates, this would be a most useful rhetorical strategy.
Now let's take a look at a positive externality. Imagine there is
a man who suffers from tuberculosis (TB). As most social workers
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are probably aware, TB is a highly contagious disease. Imagine
further that the man is aware that he has this problem and goes to
see his physician to obtain treatment. Obtaining treatment for his
condition is of obvious benefit to the man. But since TB is such
a contagious disease, by receiving treatment, the man benefits
others through decreasing the probability that they will contract
it. Yet others who benefit from the man's receiving treatment did
not voluntarily take part in an exchange in order to do so. Thus,
the benefit others derive from the man's receiving treatment is an
example of a positive externality.
Now suppose there is an indigent homeless man who suffers
from TB. Because of his impoverished status, the man is unable to
purchase treatment for his disease in the health care market. From
the point of view of economic theory, governmental actors could
justifiably enact a policy that subsidized the man's purchase of
treatment or paid for it entirely. This could be justified because
the befiefit of the treatment would not simply be enjoyed by the
homeless man but by members of the public in general.
Not only could the positive externality concept ground jus-
tification of public sector financing of TB treatment but it could
justify public sector financing of immunization against a host of
other highly contagious diseases.
The astute reader has probably realized that positive external-
ities are actually examples of public goods. Even though this is
the case, economists often discuss public goods and externalities
separately. This is because positive externalities are considered
distinct from "normal" public goods in the sense that positive
externalities are public goods that result as by products from the
production and consumption of private goods/services (Weimer
and Vining, 1992). For example, in the case of the man who went
to see his physician to get treated for TB, the benefits received by
the public result as by products from the man's purchasing the
private services of his physician. In the cases of the lighthouse and
cleaner water, these services are not by products of consumption
or production of private goods.
A third type of market failure that is relevant to the social
welfare policy concerns of social workers is imperfect informa-
tion. When it comes to many goods/services, consumers usually
have a pretty good idea about what constitutes quality. One can
Contributions of Economic Theory 153
tell if a book she is considering buying has all its pages or if a
table she is thinking about buying has all its legs. When it comes
to goods/services where individuals are knowledgeable about
their quality and other relevant matters, economic theory states
that governmental actors should allow markets to distribute such
goods/services with little or no interference. Markets that dis-
tribute goods/services of this nature are characterized by perfect
information. Markets that distribute goods/services where indi-
viduals lack information about quality or other significant matters
are characterized by imperfect information (Stevens, 1993). Let's
take a look at a market characterized by imperfect information.
Currently in the U.S., some people pay "out of pocket" for
medical services. Consumers of such services are typically unin-
formed about their quality. Most of those who are not physicians
are not in a position to know if they are getting a high quality
breast exam, a high quality x-ray, high quality out patient surgery,
etc. Thus, they are vulnerable to being harmed by incompetent
physicians; that is to say they might end up paying for sub-
standard care. By the time consumers realize their care has been
substandard it might be too late; they may have developed a grave
condition.
One way the public sector has attempted to address the prob-
lem of imperfect information in the health care market is through
licensing. That is physicians are required to pass licensing exami-
nations in order to practice. It is believed that physicians who pass
these examinations are more likely to be competent clinicians than
those who do not do so are.
The Efficiency/Equity Distinction
Social workers tend to examine social welfare policy issues
from the perspectives of fairness and need. They ask do par-
ticular policies generate fair distributions of goods/services or
do specific policies meet people's basic needs? Economists refer
to such concerns as equity concerns and although they too are
interested in these types of questions, they readily admit that their
economics training provides them with no special competence in
addressing them. Those economists who address such questions
tend to draw heavily upon the sub-discipline of moral philosophy.
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Discussions of the work of Harvard philosopher John Rawls are
frequently found in economists' musings on questions of equity
(Rawls, 1971; Stiglitz, 1988; and Stevens, 1993).
Economists feel that another important policy related concept
is their "stock and trade": the concept of efficiency. Economists
use this notion in a number of different contexts. It has to do
with attainment of the largest possible outcome given available
resources. It is relevant to the decision making of all social actors.
Individual persons are concerned with utilizing their budgets
to attain as many of the things they prefer as possible. Those
who occupy positions of authority in social service organizations
are concerned with utilizing organizational resources to attain
as many organizational objectives as possible. Elected officials
are concerned about utilizing public resources to attain as many
public objectives as possible. Let's further explore an example
from the political arena.
Suppose it were the case that the U.S. electorate and U.S.
elected officials were committed to curtailing poverty. Assume
that this commitment has emerged from a sense that such cur-
tailment would make our income distribution more equitable.
Economists qua economists would have no unique contribution
to make to the question of whether poverty ought to be curtailed.
They could make an important contribution, though, by helping
us figure out which poverty reduction policy would be likely to
be the most efficient or cost-effective.
A guaranteed income and a public jobs program are two
different approaches to curtailing poverty. A guaranteed income
is an income maintenance policy that assures that no citizen's
income falls below a certain level. People are not required to work
to receive the income guarantee. If the guarantee were set high
enough, this policy could curtail poverty.
A public jobs program is an income maintenance policy that
assures that no citizen employed in a public job would see her/his
income fall below a certain level. If the public employment wage
were set high enough, this policy could also curtail poverty.
Both of these policies would cost public dollars. Their cost
would depend, in part, on their effects on labor markets, their
effects on investment levels, their effects on the price level, their
effects on aggregate economic output, etc. Although, it should
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not be assumed that non-economists have nothing of significance
to say about these matters, it is the case that such questions fall
squarely within the domain of economics.
This is not the place to conduct the labor market, investment
level, price level, etc., analyses that would be required to for-
mulate a well-grounded prediction of which of the two poverty
reduction policies would cost the least. For the sake of illustra-
tion let's assume that such analyses have been conducted, and
it has been found that the guaranteed income approach would
probably cost the federal government about $200 billion/year,
while the public jobs approach would probably cost it about $300
billion/year. If it also appeared that both policies would reduce
poverty by the same level, the economist would recommend the
guaranteed income approach on efficiency, not equity grounds.
This is because by utilizing the least costly method, we would
be freeing up public resources that could be allocated for the
attainment of other public objectives.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to illustrate the relevance of eco-
nomics to the social welfare policy concerns of social workers. It
has placed great emphasis on the relevance of the economists'
notion of market failures. It has also considered how other ba-
sic economic concepts, such as opportunity cost and efficiency,
are pertinent to the policy concerns of social workers. It is my
hope that this attempt has convinced readers of the utility of
drawing upon economic theory in our analyses of social welfare
issues.
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